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2 See, e.g., S. Rosenne and L. Sohn (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
1982: A Commentary, vol. 5, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), at p. 5; A. E. Boyle, “Dispute
Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction,”
(1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 37–54, at p. 38.
Judicial Law-Making and the Developing
Order of the Oceans
James Harrison,
Graduate Student, Edinburgh Law School1
ABSTRACT
This article explores the powers of courts and tribunals in developing the legal order of the oceans. It
is generally accepted that the rules of treaty interpretation allow courts to look beyond the strict confines
of a treaty to other sources of evidence. Such an approach allows an evolutionary interpretation which
takes into account the contemporaneous views of the parties. In practice, courts and tribunals have
adopted a pragmatic approach to the interpretation of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention in light of
other rules of international law. By doing so, they promote flexibility in the Convention regime, albeit
at the risk of undermining the transparency and legitimacy of their decisions. In the context of the appli-
cable law, the 1982 Convention seeks to safeguard itself against change by asserting priority over other
sources of law. From a practical perspective, the role of courts in developing the Convention is limited
by the fact that few decisions have come before the courts to date. Thus, it is clear that courts by them-
selves cannot provide a satisfactory mechanism for change in the legal order of the oceans.
Judges as Law-makers?
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals over the last two decades
suggests a growing confidence in adjudication as a method of settling interna-
tional disputes. Several major modern international conventions create systems
of dispute settlement whereby powers of adjudication are conferred upon judi-
cial bodies. Does this trend also suggest an increased acceptance of a more
prominent and active role for courts and tribunals in developing international
law? If so, what are the limits, if any, on judges fulfilling this role?
In the context of the law of the sea, third-party dispute settlement is said to
play a key role in safeguarding the package deal that was achieved at the
Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.2 According to the oft-quoted
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3 See Rosenne and Sohn (eds.), supra, note 2, at p. 10.
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 21 International Legal Materials
1261. Hereinafter referred to as the ‘LOS Convention’.
5 For a discussion of the limits of dispute settlement under the LOS Convention, see gener-
ally N. Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
6 W. C. Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (Stevens, 1958), at p. 85.
7 LOS Convention, Article 296(2).
8 See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court
(Stevens, 1958), at p. 14.
9 For the locus classicus of the rule, see Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru) Judgment of 
20 November 1950 (1950) ICJ Reports 395, at p. 402.
10 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘ICJ’.
speech by the President of that Conference, “the provision of effective dispute
settlement procedures is essential for stabilizing and maintaining the compro-
mises necessary for the attainment of agreement on a convention. Dispute 
settlement will be the pivot upon which the delicate equilibrium must be bal-
anced.”3 By conferring jurisdiction on courts and tribunals for the settlement
of certain types of dispute, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention4 assures a
significant role for such organs in settling law of the sea disputes.5 Conceived
of as guardians of the package deal, the function of the courts would appear
to be one of upholding the status quo and preserving the balance of interests
as it was struck in 1982. However, in the words of Jenks, “stability and the
protection of acquired rights are essential functions of any legal system, but
no legal system can protect itself against revolution except by providing ade-
quate scope for evolutionary change.”6 This article will explore the extent to
which courts and tribunals can act as an engine of change under the LOS
Convention.
Courts are an important mechanism for change in international law, given
the general absence of standing legislative organs. Strictly speaking, of course,
judges are not law-makers. Courts and tribunals do not make law in the same
sense as legislators; they do not create law de novo. Their law-making role is
much more limited.
First and foremost, international judicial decisions do not have any binding
force beyond the parties to a dispute.7 Nevertheless, this formal status does not
fully capture the significance of the judgments of international courts and tri-
bunals. It is well established in principle and in practice that judicial organs
are likely to follow their own decisions, unless there are compelling grounds
to depart from them.8 It follows that judicial decisions which interpret and
apply the LOS Convention will be significant for all parties thereto and not
only for the states involved in a particular dispute.
Second, courts are largely guided by the submissions of the parties to a dis-
pute. The non ultra petita rule restricts a court to deciding those questions that
have been brought before it by the litigants.9 However, in the Arrest Warrant
Case, the International Court of Justice10 clarified that “while the Court is thus
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11 Arrest Warrant Case (Congo v. Belgium) Judgment of 14 February 2002 (2002) ICJ Reports 3,
at para. 43.
12 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘ITLOS’.
13 LOS Convention, Article 287(4).
14 Ibid., Article 287(5).
15 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Third LOS Conference’.
16 Rosenne and Sohn (eds.), supra, note 2, at p. 87.
17 LOS Convention, Article 298(5).
not entitled to decide upon questions not asked of it, the non ultra petita rule
nonetheless cannot preclude the Court from addressing certain legal points in
its reasoning.”11 As it is the persuasiveness of the court’s reasoning rather than
its formal power that provides the authority for its decisions, the non ultra
petita rule does not necessarily restrict the ability of courts and tribunals to
develop the law.
Third, courts and tribunals are also constrained by general principles of
treaty interpretation and application. It is these principles which determine the
proper function of a court or tribunal in developing international law and they
are the principal subject of analysis in this article. How far do these general
principles allow judges to act as law-makers? Do they provide sufficient guid-
ance to judges on the limits of legitimate judicial law-making?
Outline of the Law of the Sea Convention Dispute Settlement
Procedures
The LOS Convention does not create a single dispute settlement organ com-
petent to decide all ocean disputes; rather it permits states to choose from a
list of organs that includes the ICJ, the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea,12 and arbitration or special arbitration.13 In the absence of agreement,
arbitration is the default forum for dispute settlement.14
Whilst the Convention confers compulsory jurisdiction on courts and tri-
bunals for the settlement of many disputes arising thereunder, certain disputes
are excluded from judicial scrutiny altogether. As stated by one leading com-
mentary on the Convention, “the acceptance by many participants [at the Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea15] of the provisions for the settlement
of disputes relating to the interpretation of the LOS Convention was, from the
very beginning, conditioned on the exclusion of certain issues from the
obligation to submit them to a procedure entailing a binding decision.”16 Article 297
excludes a priori certain categories of dispute from binding dispute settlement,
whereas Article 298 sets out a list of optional exceptions which States may
invoke through a written declaration at any time prior to the initiation of dis-
pute settlement proceedings.17 Furthermore, states may under certain circum-
stances agree to exclude the procedures in Part XV of the Convention by submitting
a dispute to an alternative dispute settlement procedure. Article 280 thus pro-
vides that “nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree
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18 Rosenne and Sohn (eds.), supra, note 2, at p. 24. See also the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Arbitration (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan) Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
(2000) 39 International Legal Materials 1359.
19 LOS Convention, Article 288(2). A number of other treaties in fact do so: 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement, 1996 Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, 2001 Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Fisheries Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean,
2000 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention, 2000 Galapagos Agreement, 1993
FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, and 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural
Heritage Convention. There is a full discussion of these agreements in T. Treves, “A System
for Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement,” in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds.), The
Law of the Sea; Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2006), at pp. 417–432.
20 Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia (1923) PCIJ Reports (Ser. B) 7, at p. 27.
21 See M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, and J. C. Miller, Interpretation of Agreements and
World Public Order (Yale University Press, 1967), at p. 361. See also H. A. Hart, The
Concept of Law, 1st ed., (Oxford University Press, 1961), at p. 271.
at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice.”
Indeed, it would appear that this provision permits states to avoid the judicial
settlement of disputes altogether if they so agree.18
The procedures in Part XV of the LOS Convention are designed to settle
disputes that arise under the Convention. Article 288 sets out the jurisdictional
powers of the dispute settlement organs acting under the Convention. It pro-
vides that “a court or tribunal referred to in Article 287 shall have jurisdiction
over any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of this Conven-
tion which is submitted to it in accordance with this Part.” This provision lim-
its jurisdiction to disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the
LOS Convention and claims can only be brought under other agreements if
those agreements specifically provide for the submission of disputes to 
the LOS Convention procedures.19 This confirms the fundamental principle 
of international dispute settlement that jurisdiction is founded on the consent
of states.20
Interpretation as a Tool of Judicial Development
Whilst jurisdiction defines the scope of a court’s powers, it does not specify
how a court should perform its judicial functions. This issue depends on other
rules of international law relating to the interpretation and application of
treaties.
General Rules of Interpretation
One of the principal tasks of a judicial organ acting under Part XV is inter-
preting the LOS Convention. The act of interpretation confers a degree of dis-
cretion on courts and tribunals as there is rarely a single meaning to be
attributed to the text of a treaty.21 It is through this discretion that the courts
are able to develop the normative content of the Convention.
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22 See generally, B. Buzan, “Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,” (1981) 75 American Journal of
International Law 324–348.
23 I. Shearer, “Oceans Management Challenges for the Law of the Sea in the First Decade of
the 21st Century,” in A. Oude Elferink and D. Rothwell (eds.), Oceans Management in the
21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004), at p. 4.
24 Air Transport Agreement Arbitration (US v. France) (1963) 38 International Law Reports
182, at p. 229.
25 McDougal, Lasswell and Miller, supra, note 21, at pp. 82–83.
26 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 8 International Legal Materials 689.
27 Methanex Partial Award (2002) at para. 136. Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm>
(checked 30 January 2007).
In the case of the LOS Convention, there is arguably an even greater need
for interpretation as ambiguity arises not only because of the inherent flexi-
bility of language itself, but because of the deliberate strategy of the drafters
to produce a compromise that was acceptable to as many states as possible.
Whilst it is common in treaty negotiations for differences of opinion to be blurred
by drafting techniques, this trend was accentuated by the consensus decision-
making procedures adopted at the Third LOS Conference.22 Thus, Shearer 
describes how “on certain critical points, disagreement was papered over by
compromises or disguised by opaque texts that elude clear meaning.”23
The discretion of an interpreter is not, however, complete. The task of inter-
pretation was described by one arbitral tribunal as being to “establish with the
maximum possible certainty what the common intention of the Parties was.”24
Another author depicts the aim of interpretation as to “achieve the closest pos-
sible approximation to the genuine shared expectations of the parties.”25 Thus,
a court should not impose its own subjective interpretation of an ambiguous
text. Interpretation is a quest to discover how the parties to a treaty would
have interpreted the treaty in those circumstances.
In this quest, adjudicators are guided by the rules on treaty interpretation
which are found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.26 The
general rule is stated in Article 31 which starts: “a treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Whilst
this principle stresses the importance of the text, it does not necessitate a
purely literal interpretation of the text. As the arbitral tribunal noted in the
Methanex Case, “there is a difference between a literal meaning and the ordi-
nary meaning of a legal phrase” and the tribunal further stressed the impor-
tance of considering the meaning of a word in its context and in light of the
object and purpose of the treaty.27
An overly textual approach to interpretation is particularly inappropriate in
the case of the LOS Convention. Although the Convention is in one sense
simply a legal text, the overtly political nature of the negotiations which pre-
ceded its adoption should not be forgotten. As noted above, the treaty was not
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28 See D. Nelson, “The Work of the Drafting Committee,” in M. H. Nordquist et al. (eds.),
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, vol. 1 (Martinus
Nijhoff, 1985), at p. 144.
29 G. Plant, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatory
Commission: Models for United Nations Law-Making?” (1987) 36 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 525–558, at p. 548.
30 LOS Convention, Preamble.
31 The Monte Confurco (Prompt Release) (Seychelles v. France) Judgment of 18 December
2000 (2000) 125 International Law Reports 203, at paras. 71 and 72; repeated in The
Camouco (Prompt Release) (Panama v. France) Judgment of 7 February 2000 (2000) 125
International Law Reports 151, at para. 57. See also the Dissenting Opinion of Vice-
President Wolfrum and Judge Yamato in The M/V “Saiga” (Prompt Release) Judgment of 
4 December 1997 (1997) 110 International Law Reports 736, at para. 9.
32 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Treves in The Camouco, supra, note 31, at para. 6.
33 See The Camouco, supra, note 31, at para. 58.
necessarily drafted to be as accurate as possible, but rather to be as acceptable
to as many states as possible. Whilst a drafting committee was appointed by
the Third LOS Conference, it was not possible to solve all problems submit-
ted to it.28 As a consequence, one author concludes that “use of the same word
in different provisions is, unusually, not necessarily intended to have the same
consequence, and use of different words is not necessarily intended to have
different consequences in every case.”29 The Convention must be interpreted
with these considerations in mind. In these circumstances, the context and
object and purpose of the Convention assume a still greater importance.
One objective of the Convention that may prove particularly useful in its
interpretation is the desire of the drafters to create a single, comprehensive
treaty settling all issues relating to the law of the sea.30 Such an objective not
only underlines that the Convention must be interpreted as a whole, but that
competing interests must be balanced by the interpreter.
The importance of balancing competing interests is illustrated by some of
the decisions of the ITLOS on prompt release. For instance, in its judgment
in The Monte Confurco, the Tribunal held that “the object of article 292 of the
Convention is to reconcile the interest of the flag State to have its vessel and
its crew released promptly with the interest of the detaining State to secure
appearance in its court of the Master and the payment of penalties.”31 In The
Camouco, Judge Treves emphasised the need for balance in the following
terms: “The Tribunal should not give preference to one or the other of these
two points of view . . . both find their legitimacy in the Convention.”32
The balancing of interests can also be seen in the Tribunal’s decision in the
same case on whether or not an obligation to exhaust local remedies should be
read into Article 292. The Tribunal stressed that “no limitation should be read
into article 292 that would have the effect of defeating its very object and pur-
pose . . . article 292 permits the making of an application within a short period
from the date of detention and it is not normally the case that local remedies
could be exhausted in such a short period.”33 In other words, applying the
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34 On the ordinary meaning of the text, this was not necessarily the only interpretation. For an
alternative argument, see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anderson in The Camouco, supra,
note 31, at pp. 1–2.
35 M/V “Saiga” (Prompt Release), supra, note 31, at para. 81.
36 The Volga (Prompt Release) (Russia v. Australia) Judgment of 23 December 2002 (2003) 
42 International Legal Materials 159, at para. 77.
37 Ibid.
38 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anderson in The Volga, ibid., at para. 18.
39 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Shearer in The Volga, ibid., at para. 19.
local remedies rule to prompt release cases would tip the balance against
shipowners, as the safeguard afforded by Article 292 would offer limited 
protection if it was first necessary to pursue a case through local courts.34
Similarly, in The M/V “Saiga” (Prompt Release) the Tribunal refused to
accede to the argument of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines that the release
of the vessel should be ordered without the posting of any bond at all. It held
that “the posting of a bond or security seems to the Tribunal necessary in view
of the nature of the prompt release proceedings.”35 For the Tribunal, the post-
ing of a bond was an important factor in the balance of rights and obligations
between coastal states and flag states and the Tribunal rejected an interpreta-
tion which would have unduly upset one side of that balance.
Of course, it is not always obvious where the balance should be struck and
competing views may arise. Such was the case in The Volga, where the
Tribunal had to decide whether the concept of a reasonable bond should 
be interpreted to permit non-pecuniary conditions. The Tribunal reasoned that
“where the Convention envisages the imposition of conditions additional to a
bond or other financial security, it expressly states so.”36 Furthermore, in its
opinion, the imposition of such a bond would defeat the object and purpose
of Article 73(2) which was to “provide the flag state with a mechanism for
obtaining the prompt release of a vessel and crew arrested for alleged fisheries
violations by posting a security of a financial nature whose reasonableness can
be assessed in financial terms.”37 Criticising the decision of the majority, Judge
Anderson, however, noted that the description of the object and purpose of
Article 73(2) was overly one-sided: “an additional element in the object and
purpose is to provide the safeguard for the coastal state . . .” He concluded that
“to the extent to which there is some sort of balance in these provisions
between the interests of the two states concerned, that balanced treatment
should not be tilted in favour of one or the other.”38 Judge ad hoc Shearer,
who also dissented, urged recognition of the fact that the context of illegal and
unregulated fishing had changed since the conclusion of the LOS Convention
and “a new “balance” has to be struck between vessel owners, operators and
fishing companies on the one hand, and coastal States on the other.”39
This case illustrates a particular difficulty that can arise for a court in inter-
preting a treaty of unlimited duration. In these circumstances, the expectations
of the parties may change over time and therefore the balance to be made may
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40 Declaration of Judge Mensah in The Camouco, supra, note 31, at para. 4.
41 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra, note 26, Article 32.
42 G. G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points,” (1951) 28 British Yearbook of International
Law 1–28, at p. 15.
43 A. McNair, “The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties” (1930) 11 British
Yearbook of International Law 100–118, at pp. 107–108.
44 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez, in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention
Advisory Opinion (1951) ICJ Reports 15, at p. 53.
be different to that prevailing at the time when the treaty was concluded. In
this context, is a court permitted to take into account changes in the attitudes
of the parties? If so, how does a court determine an appropriate interpretation
of the treaty without overstepping its judicial function?
Where to strike the balance between the competing interests of states may
be helped by reference to other sources of evidence as to what their expecta-
tions are. As Judge Mensah notes, “it is neither reasonable nor possible for the
Tribunal to confine itself in every case to the bare language of the Con-
vention’s provisions. It is permitted, indeed required, to “flesh out” the bones
of the provisions to the extent necessary in the circumstances in order to attain
the object and purpose of the provisions in question.”40 We now turn to the
question of what extrinsic evidence a court may invoke in order to establish
the expectations of the parties.
Travaux Préparatoires
One source which will certainly offer an insight into the intentions of the par-
ties to a treaty is the records of the discussions that took place during nego-
tiations of the text. Yet the use of travaux préparatoires in the interpretation
of a treaty is an issue that has long been the subject of controversy and debate
by courts and commentators. Indeed, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties pointedly classifies the preparatory materials of a treaty as
a “supplementary” source of interpretation.41 The argument against relying on
travaux préparatoires is forcefully made by Fitzmaurice, who says, “[they] are
often extremely confused and confusing. They usually contain material sup-
porting both the points of view in issue . . . states come to a conference with
many views and intentions that are subsequently abandoned in the course of
the conference; but it is not always clear that they were abandoned, and they
may remain on the records as representing a view apparently maintained
throughout.”42 Indeed the argument against referring to preparatory materials
may be stronger still in the case of some multilateral treaties which have a
law-making character.43 In the Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the
Genocide Convention, Judge Alvarez took the view that “[multilateral] con-
ventions [of a legislative character] must not be interpreted with reference to
the preparatory work which preceded them, they are distinct from that work
and they have acquired a life of their own.”44
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45 Arbitral Award on Pollution of the Rhine (Netherlands v. France) (2004) at para. 70.
Available at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/PBF/Sentence%20I.pdf> (checked 
30 November 2006).
46 Lauterpacht, supra, note 8, at p. 138.
47 Plant, supra, note 29, at pp. 555–556.
48 Ibid., at p. 552.
It may be taking it too far to say that courts and tribunals should never have
recourse to the negotiations of a treaty in its interpretation. Indeed, it is com-
mon for the ICJ and other courts and tribunals to take into account the travaux
préparatoires as one means for supporting a particular interpretation.45 Usually,
such materials are invoked as support for an interpretation arrived at through
other means, but Lauterpacht sceptically suggests that “it is not certain that the
clarity of the meaning said to have been confirmed by the preparatory work
was not actually due to the illumination obtained by the study of the latter.”46
However, it should also be noted that the views expressed in the travaux pré-
paratoires may no longer be held by states. Giving too much weight to pre-
paratory materials may lead to a static interpretation of a treaty text fixed at
the time of its conclusion. Therefore, preparatory materials must be considered
in light of other contemporaneous sources of evidence as to the expectations
of the parties.
In the case of the LOS Convention, reliance on preparatory materials raises
other difficulties. Many of the negotiations at the Third LOS Conference took
place in off-the-record sessions and there are no comprehensive official pre-
paratory materials available to aid in interpretation. As a consequence, Plant
argues that there is a need for “a more liberal, process-orientated approach.”
He continues, “interpreters . . . should be prepared to look at all formal and
informal statements, interventions, texts and proposals made at all stages and
in all forums of the negotiation, including informal extra-conference groups,
as aids to interpretation of the Convention.”47 Furthermore, he argues that a
special emphasis should be placed on the opinions and writings of the dele-
gates who attended the Third LOS Conference: “The delegates and the rele-
vant supporting staff in their ministries are peculiarly placed to know the
background of a provision, and their views, in so far as they are able and pre-
pared to make them public—and in many cases they are not—should be 
particularly influential upon interpretations of the [LOS Convention].”48
However, such sources should nevertheless be treated with caution. There is a
danger that the opinions of delegates may only provide a partial account of
the negotiations; all delegates, including the officers of the Conference, were,
after all, acting on behalf of their governments.
In practice, decisions of the Tribunal have not extensively relied on prepara-
tory materials, although individual judges of the ITLOS have been willing to
cite official and unofficial records of the Third LOS Conference in order to
support a particular interpretation. For instance, in The M/V “Saiga” (Prompt
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49 See the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ndiaye, Nelson, Park, Rao and Vukas in M/V
“Saiga” (Prompt Release), supra, note 31, at paras. 23–26. It is notable that many of these
judges were involved in the negotiations at the Third LOS Conference themselves as dele-
gates. As noted by the President of the Tribunal, “there is no other international court whose
judges were also draftsmen of the Convention that they were asked to interpret and apply;”
ITLOS Press Release of 27 March 2002, ITLOS/Press64.
50 E.g., Judge Laing makes numerous references to the Virginia Commentary in his separate
opinions in The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) Judgment of 1 July 1999 (1999) 120 International Legal
Materials 143, and in Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Provisional Measures) (Australia and
New Zealand v. Japan) Order of 27 August 1999 (1999) 117 International Law Reports 148.
51 The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2), supra, note 50, at paras. 80–82.
52 For the other grounds of the decision, see discussion below in the present text under “Other
Rules and Principles of International Law.”
53 See LOS Convention, Article 310.
54 For the text of the declarations, see the website of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and
Law of the Sea: <www.un.org/depts/los>.
Release), Judges Ndiaye, Nelson, Park, Rao and Vukas inquired into the leg-
islative history of Article 292 in order to support their textual analysis of that
provision.49 Furthermore, the Virginia Commentary on the LOS Convention—
a scholarly account of the drafting history penned by several prominent par-
ticipants at the Conference—is seemingly treated by some judges as a quasi-official
source for interpretative purposes.50
It should also be noted that it is not only the negotiations at the Third LOS
Conference that may provide guidance as to the meaning of the LOS Con-
vention. As some provisions of the LOS Convention are based on similar, if
not identical, provisions of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea, the drafting history of these treaties may also be relevant. These materi-
als are much more detailed than those of the Third LOS Conference, given
that the articles were first prepared by the International Law Commission and
then subjected to a more traditional conference procedure where all formal dis-
cussions were officially recorded. In The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) the ITLOS
relied on the work of the International Law Commission and the reports of the
First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in its interpretation of provisions
which had been incorporated from the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.51
Affirming the subsidiary role of travaux préparatoires, however, the drafting
history was only invoked as confirmation of an interpretation arrived at
through other means, including the subsequent views of states.52
Unilateral Statements and Declarations
Another factor that may be taken into account in the interpretative process is
unilateral statements made by states at the time of signature, ratification or
accession to the Convention.53 In some circumstances, unilateral declarations
may provide evidence in support of a particular interpretation. Often, however,
an analysis of the declarations made by states only reveals strong disagree-
ments over how the Convention should be interpreted.54 One need only con-
sider the diversity of opinions over the innocent passage of warships through
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55 See, e.g., The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2), supra, note 50, at paras. 69 and 71.
56 Dispute Relating to the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental
Shelf (Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago) (2006) at para. 88. Available at http://www.pca-
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the territorial sea to realise that declarations could hinder rather than help a
court come to an authoritative interpretation of the text.
In many cases, such statements are remarkably similar to statements made
by delegates at the closing sessions of the Conference itself, so there is an
overlap with the travaux préparatoires themselves. Indeed, as with travaux
préparatoires, such declarations cannot constitute an authoritative interpreta-
tion of the Convention and they should be balanced against other sources of
interpretation.
Unilateral interpretations and declarations may be relevant to the resolution
of a dispute in another context. In the context of litigation, courts and tribunals
have taken into account unilateral acts and statements made prior to a dispute55
or in their oral pleadings.56 It is suggested that declarations made under Article 310
of the LOS Convention may play a similar role in litigation, preventing a state
from proposing an interpretation which is contrary to its Article 310 declara-
tion. Nevertheless, this is only legitimate if it is clear that the declaration still
represents the views of a state and the state involved has not since modified
its position.
Other Rules and Principles of International Law
It has already been stressed that the expectations of the parties are not set in
stone when a treaty is drafted and the circumstances in which a treaty was
intended to apply may also change. In the words of Higgins, “the notion of
‘original intention’ has long been qualified by the idea that the parties them-
selves, because of the nature of the treaty that they agreed to, just have
assumed that matters would evolve.”57 Indeed, interpreting a treaty without
regard to changes in the surrounding circumstances could threaten the ultimate
viability of a treaty settlement. How does a court identify the current views of
states on the interpretation of a treaty? Reference to other rules and principles
of international law is one method which may help an adjudicator to identify
the current expectations of the parties, thereby promoting the ongoing stabil-
ity of the treaty settlement.
In some cases, the LOS Convention itself mandates the consideration of
other rules of international law. Examples of a direct renvoi to other rules of
international law are Articles 74(1) and 83(1) on maritime boundary delimita-
tion which both refer to “international law as referred to in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.” As the Arbitral Tribunal said in
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as amended on 15 March and 21 September 2001.
the Barbados—Trinidad Arbitration, “this apparently simple and imprecise for-
mula allows in fact for a broad consideration of the legal rules embodied in
treaties and customary law as pertinent to the delimitation between the parties,
and allows as well for the consideration of general principles of international
law and the contributions that the decisions of international courts and tri-
bunals and learned writers have made to the understanding and interpretation
of this body of legal rules.”58 Similarly, many of the provisions on the pre-
vention of marine pollution make reference to generally accepted international
rules and standards.59 These provisions allow the Convention to develop over
time without requiring formal amendment or modification by the States
Parties.
In other cases, reference to other rules and principles of international law
may be possible under general principles of interpretation. Recognition that an
instrument must be interpreted in light of the context at the time of its inter-
pretation is found in two paragraphs of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.
First, Article 31(3)(b) obliges an interpreter to take into account the “subsequent
practice in the application of a treaty” where it amounts to an “agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation.” The commentary to this Article makes
clear that the practice must establish the agreement of all parties to the treaty,
although it is not necessary for the practice to be attributable to all those 
parties.60 ‘Practice’ is not defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, but it should arguably be considered as a flexible concept, as long as
it demonstrates the opinions of the parties. It conceivably includes both phys-
ical practice as well as the adoption of international instruments, including
non-binding resolutions and declarations. In particular, the decisions of organs
created by the treaty will be highly pertinent. It is on this basis that decisions
of the Meeting of the States Parties to the LOS Convention may be relevant
to the interpretation of the Convention. Although the United Nations General
Assembly has no formal role under the Convention, its annual resolutions on
the law of the sea may arguably also provide important context for its inter-
pretation, as it includes all States Parties to the LOS Convention, as well as
other important maritime states.
Nor is it only decisions adopted by intergovernmental institutions that may
be relevant under this provision. One illustration is the Rules of the Tribunal
adopted by the ITLOS.61 The Rules are authorized by Article 16 of the Statute
of the Tribunal and they were drafted exclusively by the Members of the
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Tribunal without any input from States Parties. Nevertheless, the Rules have
been invoked by the ITLOS as context for the interpretation of the LOS
Convention. In The Camouco, the Tribunal interpreted Article 292 of the
Convention by reference to Article 113 of its Rules in order to support its con-
clusion that an applicant must show that its arguments are “well founded.”62
In the same case, the dissenting opinion of Judge Wolfrum also argued that
the Rules guided the Tribunal in what to take into account in determining the
reasonableness of a bond, because they require the detaining state to provide
information on the value of the ship and on the amount of the requested
bond.63 Presumably, the Rules are a valid source of interpretative material
because they have been authorised by the Convention and the ITLOS judges
are elected by the States Parties themselves. In this context, it is also possible
that some decisions by the Commission on the Limits of the Outer Continental
Shelf may also be taken in account in the interpretative process.
Second, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides that an interpreter shall take into account “any relevant rules of inter-
national law applicable in the relations between the parties.” This provision allows
recourse to other sources of extrinsic evidence that may not be directly related
to the treaty itself, but are nevertheless relevant.64 Relevance will often depend
on the particular context of a treaty and the provisions being interpreted.
Article 31(3)(c) does not expressly say whether the rules of international law
it refers to are those at the time of conclusion or at the time of interpretation
and it appears that the International Law Commission deliberately left this
issue open, saying “the relevance of international law for the interpretation of
treaties in any given case was dependent on the intentions of the parties.”65
A so-called evolutionary approach to interpretation was adopted by the ICJ
in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, where the Court was faced with interpret-
ing and applying Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the
text of the Mandate for South West Africa, virtually fifty years since their
promulgation and in a different institutional context. The Court held that cer-
tain concepts connected with the Mandate system were “by definition evolu-
tionary” and the parties must be “deemed to have accepted them as such.”66 It
followed that the Court had to “take into consideration the changes which
have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain
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unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the
United Nations and by way of customary international law.”67 In a more recent
decision, the arbitral tribunal in the Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration appeared
to adopt a more general approach to evolutionary interpretation, holding that
“in the present case, it is not a conceptual or generic term that is in issue, but
rather new technical developments relating to the operation and capacity of the
railway. But here, too, it seems that an evolutive [sic] interpretation, which
would ensure an application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of
its object and purpose, will be preferred to a strict application of the intertem-
poral rule.”68 It would seem that the basis of the Tribunal’s reasoning in this
case is the fact that the treaty was not intended to govern the relationship
between the two states for a “limited or fixed duration”69 only and therefore it
was necessary that it was applied in light of contemporaneous concerns.70
Higgins notes that “this same trend is discernable across courts, tribunals and
arbitration tribunals”71 and it is likely that courts will increasingly adopt an
evolutionary approach to interpretation.
Precisely which rules of international law are relevant under Article 31(3)(c)
is the subject of some controversy. Some commentators claim that only those
rules of international law which are binding on all the parties to the treaty can
be invoked in aid of interpretation.72 McLachlan explains that this is necessary
so that an interpretation imposes consistent obligations on all the parties to it.73
By contrast, French suggests that the concept of uniformity of interpretation,
whilst an admirable notion, does not actually match the reality of the interna-
tional legal system.74 Thus, he argues that Article 31(3)(c) refers to all those
parties involved in the dispute. However, it is suggested that, at least in the
case of the LOS Convention, the latter approach is not suitable. The General
Assembly has regularly stressed the need to uphold the integrity of the Convention,
which calls for a uniform interpretation thereof.75 Indeed, one of the purposes
of compulsory dispute settlement is to guarantee a harmonised interpretation
of the Convention. The integrity of the LOS Convention would not be pro-
tected if it had different meanings for different parties. At the same time,
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requiring all the States Parties to the LOS Convention to be bound by an
instrument before it can be invoked in interpretation sets a very high thresh-
old. The appropriate approach would appear to be that suggested, inter alia,
by Pauwelyn, who argues that other instruments may be taken into account in
interpretation if they reflect the common intention of the parties, whether or
not the parties are actually bound by the instrument.76
A study of the few ITLOS decisions to date illustrates that in certain cir-
cumstances the Tribunal has been willing to take into account other rules of
international law even when there is no express reference to such rules in the
text of the Convention. It did so in The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) when it was
interpreting Article 94 of the Convention concerning the genuine link between
a ship and a flag state.77 In support of its decision on Article 94, the Tribunal
made reference to the 1986 Convention on the Conditions for the Registration
of Ships,78 the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, and the 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement,79 even though none of these instruments had entered into force at
the time of the dispute. It should be noted that these references to international
instruments only served to support an interpretation that had been arrived at
by the Tribunal on other grounds. In this instance, there had apparently been
no change in the attitude of states as the subsequent instruments simply
confirmed an interpretation that had been arrived at through consideration of
the travaux préparatoires. Technically, therefore, this was not a case of evo-
lutionary interpretation, but it nevertheless demonstrates the willingness of the
Tribunal to look at extrinsic evidence of the parties’ expectations.
Yet the basis for taking these other instruments into account was not made
clear by the Tribunal. It did not state whether it considered these other instru-
ments to be the practice of the parties in the application of the LOS Con-
vention or other rules of international law relevant to its interpretation. As the
instruments were not in force at the time, it is doubtful whether they could be
considered rules of international law, unless they are declaratory of custom. At
the same time, it is not clear that they are the subsequent practice of the par-
ties in application of the Convention, as the instruments were adopted in very
different institutional contexts. If this is the case, however, it suggests a very
flexible attitude to what amounts to subsequent practice.
To take another example, in The M/V “Saiga” (Prompt Release), the
Tribunal looked to state practice to interpret the phrase “sovereign rights to
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone” in Article 73 of the Convention. The Tribunal invoked, inter
alia, Article 1 of the 1989 Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with
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Long Driftnets in the South Pacific80 as evidence of the fact that the concept
of fishing activities could include the provision of fuel and other supplies 
to fishing vessels.81 However, in this case, not all judges were convinced 
that this instrument was relevant to Article 73. Vice-President Wolfrum and
Judge Yamamoto objected to the invocation of the Driftnet Convention, argu-
ing that the definition of fishing activities therein was agreed on specifically
for the purpose of that treaty and it could not simply be transferred to the LOS
Convention.82 They also noted that Article 1 of the Driftnet Convention con-
cerned flag state jurisdiction, not coastal state jurisdiction which was the sub-
ject of the provision being interpreted.
This criticism highlights the fact that in order to be taken into account for
the purposes of interpretation, the rule or principle must be able to shed light
on an ambiguous term in the LOS Convention. Moreover, it cannot always be
assumed that two instruments should be interpreted in the exactly same way,
simply because they use similar language. In the MOX Plant Case (Provisional
Measures), the ITLOS stressed that the distinct identities of two instruments
is important. The limitations on invoking other instruments in the interpreta-
tive process were noted, as “even if the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty
and the Euratom Treaty contain rights or obligations similar to or identical
with the rights or obligations set out in the [LOS] Convention, the rights and
obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from those under
the [LOS] Convention . . . the application of international law rules on inter-
pretation of treaties to identical or similar provisions of different treaties may
not yield the same results, having regard to, inter alia, differences in the
respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent practice of the parties
and travaux préparatoires.”83
Clearly, there is a fine balance between interpreting a treaty in light of
developments in the rules and principles of international law and modifying
the terms of a treaty as agreed by the drafters. In the case of the LOS
Convention, an adjudicator must be careful that the balance of rights and obli-
gations is not overturned by an overly enthusiastic evolutionary interpretation.
It would appear that the predominant approach of the ITLOS to the issue of
interpretation leans towards pragmatism. Yet there is a danger in such an approach.
The ICJ has stressed on several occasions that treaty interpretation, whether
evolutionary or not, should not turn into treaty revision.84 In order to avoid
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this, there must be strong evidence that an evolutionary interpretation is sup-
ported by the States Parties. The weakness in the decisions to date is the fail-
ure to identify in what capacity other rules of international law have been
invoked. Further guidance in this matter would not only clarify the applicable
principles, but also add greater legitimacy to the decisions by increasing their
transparency.
Applicable Law
Interpretation is not the only situation in which other rules of international law
may be relevant to the task of a court or tribunal acting under the LOS Convention.
Article 293 provides that courts and tribunals deciding disputes under the
Convention may apply both the Convention and “other rules of international
law not incompatible with this Convention.” In this context, other rules of inter-
national law can include other treaties, as well as customary international law.
It should be stressed that Article 293 does not act as a carte blanche to
apply any rules that are applicable between the disputing parties. The concept
of applicable law does not enlarge the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal to
consider any legal claims arising between the disputing states. Such a liberal
concept of applicable law would have the result of converting the jurisdiction
of courts and tribunals acting under the LOS Convention into “an unqualified
and comprehensive jurisdictional regime in which there would be no limit
ratione materiae.”85 In this sense, applicable law and jurisdiction must be
clearly distinguished.86
What is the purpose of Article 293? It is suggested that this provision per-
mits an adjudicator to apply such rules and principles of international law that
are necessary in order to decide a dispute under the Convention. Most of the
rules that a court or tribunal will have to apply in this way will thus be sec-
ondary rules of general international law. The ITLOS has, for instance,
referred on several occasions to the law of state responsibility in its judg-
ments. The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) is once again a good illustration of the way
in which other rules of international law may be applied. In that case, the
Tribunal cited the “well-established rule of international law that a State which
suffers damage as a result of an internationally wrongful act by another State
is entitled to obtain reparation for the damage suffered from the State which
committed the wrongful act”87 and it made reference to Article 42 of the ILC
Draft Articles on State Responsibility which specifies the forms that reparation
may take.88 In addition, the law of state responsibility was relevant to the case
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because Guinea had invoked the doctrine of necessity as a defence to the
claims submitted against it.89 In this context, the Tribunal referred to the deci-
sion of the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case as well as Article 33(1) of
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.90 Whilst it did not deny that neces-
sity could be invoked as a justification for a violation of the Convention, thus
affirming the applicability of the law of state responsibility in proceedings
under the Convention, the Tribunal nevertheless held that Guinea had not
satisfied the Tribunal that its essential interests were in grave and imminent
peril.91 If Article 293 is limited to the application of secondary rules, it will
have a limited impact on the application of the substantive norms set out in
the LOS Convention.
Yet is it only secondary rules that can be applied in this way? An analysis
of The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) suggests not. In that case, Saint Vincent made
several claims that had no basis in the Convention itself. First, it alleged that
by citing Saint Vincent as civilly liable in connection with criminal proceed-
ings instigated in the domestic courts of Guinea, Guinea had violated its rights
under international law.92 Although the Tribunal dismissed the claim because
it did not constitute a violation of international law,93 in doing so it failed to
explain on what basis it would have had jurisdiction to entertain such a claim
if it were indeed arguable.
Saint Vincent had also alleged that the Guinean authorities had used exces-
sive and unreasonable force when they were arresting the M/V “Saiga.” As
the Convention does not contain express rules on the use of force in the arrest
of ships, the claim was necessarily based on customary international law.
Citing the application of international law according to Article 293, the
Tribunal held that “international law . . . requires that the use of force must be
avoided as far as possible and where force is unavoidable, it must not go
beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.”94 To support
its reference to general principles of law, the Tribunal referred to the 1995
Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 22(1)(f) of which, it held, confirmed the prin-
ciples that it thought were applicable. In other words, the Tribunal was not
applying the 1995 Agreement; rather it was invoking the Agreement as an
illustration of a general principle of law that was applicable to the disputing
parties. In the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal held that use of force
by the Guinean authorities did not meet these conditions.95 It is again clear
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from the judgment that the claims on the unreasonable and unnecessary use of
force were considered as separate from the claim alleging a violation of the
Convention’s provisions on hot pursuit. To consolidate this point, the finding
of a violation of the rules of international law on the use of force in the course
of the arrest is contained in a separate paragraph of the dispositif.96 Again,
given that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to claims made under the
Convention, it is not clear from the judgment on what basis the Tribunal made
this finding. Arguably, it is not simply a question of applicable law as is sup-
posed by the Tribunal, and it ignores the crucial distinction between jurisdic-
tion and applicable law outlined above.
Such a flexible approach to applicable law raises the possibility that appli-
cable law may be invoked in order to change the substantive rules of the LOS
Convention. There is, however, a limitation created by the Convention itself,
as Article 293 appears to prioritise the application of the LOS Convention.
Klein comments that “a hierarchy is created whereby the foremost law gov-
erning the dispute is the Convention and in the case of conflict between [the
LOS Convention] and existing law, the Convention must prevail.”97 Therefore,
a court or tribunal acting under the LOS Convention will not be able to over-
ride the balance of rights and obligations achieved in the Convention through
the application of conflicting sources of law.98
Conflicts of law between the LOS Convention and other treaties have not
yet been raised in the course of litigation. However, in The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2)
the Tribunal considered arguments raised by Guinea that its actions were
justified because they were taken in order to “protect itself against unwar-
ranted economic activities in its exclusive economic zone that considerably
affect its public interest.”99 The Tribunal held that the so-called principle of
public interest invoked by Guinea was not compatible with the Convention as
it would allow a coastal state to prohibit any activities which it deemed to
affect its public interest, unilaterally curtailing the rights of other states in vio-
lation of the Convention.100 Although not explicitly based on the priority of the
Convention over other sources of international law, it is an illustration of the
importance that the Tribunal accords to upholding the balance of rights and
obligations in the Convention.
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Conclusion
This article has considered the role of courts and tribunals in upholding the
status quo of the LOS Convention whilst satisfying countervailing pressures
for progressive development of the legal framework.
The concept of applicable law would appear to offer few opportunities for
an adjudicator to develop the law. The mandate to apply other sources of inter-
national law arguably does not allow a court to consider claims under other
sources of law that are not necessary to decide the dispute under the treaty.
Nor can a court or tribunal set aside the Convention through the application
of other sources of law, as the Convention assumes priority.
Interpretation is then the principal way in which judges can develop the
LOS Convention. In doing so, a court can take note of other rules of interna-
tional law, thus permitting an interpretation of the LOS Convention which
takes into account the current views of the parties. It would appear that a wide
variety of instruments may be invoked for this purpose, including travaux pré-
paratoires, unilateral statements or declarations, the decisions of international
institutions, or other international treaties, as long as they can be shown to be
relevant and to command the support of the States Parties.
There would appear to be no fixed formula for determining when sufficient
support exists or the form which such support should take. As a result, there
is an ambiguity in the general principles of interpretation which consequently
confers on the courts a limited degree of discretion. Yet this discretion must be
used with care. Interpretation should not be a cloak for the revision of a treaty.
The practice of courts and tribunals to date has not clarified in what circum-
stances other rules of international law can be used in interpreting the LOS
Convention. A pragmatic approach seems to be preferred. Whilst this approach
promotes flexibility, it does so at the risk of undermining the transparency and
legitimacy of judicial decisions. As it is the persuasiveness of judicial deci-
sions, rather than their formal status, which confers their law-making poten-
tial, this risk is one that should not be taken lightly.
Although there is a potential for judicial development of the LOS Con-
vention, it has not been fully realised to date. A reason for this may be that
very few substantive disputes have been brought before dispute settlement
bodies and many of those decisions have primarily involved procedural points
or ancillary issues of law. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of development of 
a treaty through interpretation is that it relies on cases coming to court in 
the first place. Taking into account all of these limitations on the role of
judges in law-making, substantive and procedural, it is clear that courts by
themselves cannot provide a satisfactory mechanism to safeguard the long-
term sustainability of a treaty as important and politically sensitive as the LOS
Convention.
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